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MAKING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CUT:
EVALUATING NEW YORK'S DEATH PENALTY
STATUTE IN LIGHT OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MANDATES
Jason M. Schoenberg*
INTRODUCTION
This country engages in a daily debate regarding the morality
of the death penalty.1 Barring any change in the United States
Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence, capital punishment
will remain a constitutionally acceptable form of punishment.2
While the Supreme Court has deemed the death penalty constitu-
tional, only certain states have chosen to implement capital
punishment. Currently thirty-eight states,3 including New York,
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2000; B.A., Binghamton University, 1997.
This Note is dedicated to the author's mother for never letting him fail.
See, e.g., William Glaberson, For a Brooklyn Prosecutor, Duty Calls but
Conviction Shouts, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at B4 (discussing Brooklyn District
Attorney, Charles J. Hynes, who has openly opposed the death penalty, but
upheld his responsibility to apply it as law).
2 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80, 187 (1976). In Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), the Supreme Court reversed a
number of death sentences imposed without statutory guidelines. Four years later
in 1976, the Supreme Court ruled in Gregg that the death penalty was per se
constitutional. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169. State legislatures, however, were required
to create statutory sentencing standards to guide sentencing bodies. Id. at 195.
3 The 38 states that have adopted death penalty statutes are: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washing-
ton, and Wyoming. Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Death
Penalty Information (visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/>.
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have death penalty statutes, each following its own statutory rules
for imposition.4
While the moral debate over the death penalty endures outside
the courts, the structuring of death penalty statutes has encountered
many constitutional challenges in the Supreme Court. This Note
will focus on the latter issue.
The United States Supreme Court has rendered numerous
decisions regarding the structure of death penalty statutes, in effect
setting minimum requirements that a statute must contain to pass
constitutional scrutiny.5 Generally, the Supreme Court has held it
to be unconstitutional for a state statute to permit imposition of a
death sentence in an "arbitrary and capricious" manner,6 or in a
4 See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39 to -59 (1994); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
703 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-601 to -618 (Michie
1997); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1-.9 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-11-103 (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (1994 & Supp. 1999);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141 (1999);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 to -31 (1997); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Supp.
1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); IND. CODE § 35-
50-2-9 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025 (Michie Supp. 1998); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905 (West
1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101
(1994 & Supp. 1999); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 565.030-.040 (1999); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 46-18-301 to -310 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2521 to -2534
(1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.030-.035 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 31-18-14 to -15 (Michie 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27
(McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney
Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2929.03-.05 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 701.9-.15 (1983 & Supp.
1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1997); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9711 (West
1998); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20 to -25 (Law. Co-op. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 23A-27A-1 to -14 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-202 to -
206 (Supp. 1999); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 1994); TEX. CRIM. P.
CODE ANN. § 37.071 (West 1981 & Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-206
to -207 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2 to -264.5 (Michie 1996); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 10.95.020 - .190 (1990 & Supp. 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-
101 to -103 (Michie Supp. 1994).
5 See infra Part I, outlining the constitutional requirements of death penalty
statutes.
6 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188; Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. See also infra Part
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manner that does not allow a jury to consider a defendant's
background, character, and the circumstances of the crime.7
Presently, statutes meeting these conditions contain two provisions:
first, a statute must provide for guided discretion8 in the form of
aggravating factors that narrow eligibility;9 second, statutes must
provide for individualized sentencing' ° by permitting the sentencer
to consider mitigating evidence."
New York's recently re-enacted death penalty statute 2 is a
model statute for several reasons. Generally, death penalty statutes
fall into two categories: weighing and non-weighing. 3 New York,
I.B, discussing the guided discretion requirement.
7 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978). See infra Part I.C,
discussing the individualized sentencing requirement.
8 The term "guided discretion" arose out of the Supreme Court's decision
in Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U.S. at 195. Guided discretion can be defined as
"statutory sentencing standards to guide sentencing bodies" in making capital
punishment decisions. Lief H. Carter, Capital Punishment, in THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 126 (Kermit L.
Hall ed., 1992).
9 Aggravating factors are defined as "any circumstance attending the
commission of a crime ... which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its
injurious consequences." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 65 (6th ed. 1990).
'0 The term "individualized sentencing" arose out of the Supreme Court's
decision in Lockett v. Ohio. 438 U.S. at 604-05. Individualized sentencing can
be defined as "consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense." Id. at 604 (quoting
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
" Mitigating circumstances are defined as those that "do not constitute a
justification or excuse for the offense in question, but which, in fairness and
mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral
culpability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1002 (6th ed. 1990).
12 In 1995, Governor George E. Pataki approved the long inactive New York
death penalty legislation. See James Dao, Death Penalty in New York is Restored
After 18 Years: Pataki Sees Justice Served, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al
(discussing Gov. Pataki's signing of the death penalty bill into law). See also Act
of Mar. 7, 1995, ch. 1, 1995 N.Y. Laws 218 (New York's death penalty legisla-
tion). New York's death penalty law took effect on September 1, 1995. See infra
note 95 (discussing the history of the death penalty in New York).
"3 Weighing schemes provide specific instructions on how the aggravating
and mitigating factors are to be weighed against each other in determining a
sentence. See Stephen Hornbuckle, Note, Capital Sentencing Procedure: A Lethal
Oddity in the Supreme Court's Case Law, 73 TEX. L. REV. 441, 448-49 (1994).
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however, falls into neither category, but rather incorporates aspects
of both. Both weighing and non-weighing statutes have been held
constitutional in format. Each, however, has been criticized for
either failing to provide guidance to the sentencer or providing too
much guidance to the sentencer, thus, failing to give full effect to
the mandates of Gregg v. Georgia4 and Lockett v. Ohio.'5 The
New York statute gives full effect to both constitutional mandates
by meeting each mandate in separate phases of the capital trial.
New York limits the imposition of a death sentence to only those
defendants convicted of first-degree murder. 6 To be convicted of
first-degree murder in New York, the murder must have been
committed under one of twelve enumerated aggravating factors.'
7
Each factor, for which the prosecutor introduces evidence, must be
proven in the guilt phase of trial beyond a reasonable doubt in
order to be established during sentencing.' 8 The inclusion of
twelve aggravating factors meets the Gregg mandate.' 9
The statute then essentially provides for a mitigation hearing
during the sentencing phase, thereby eliminating the prejudice of
introducing evidence of aggravation after the guilt stage has
concluded.20 The inclusion of mitigating evidence satisfies the
Non-weighing schemes simply list factors, both aggravating and mitigating, but
do not provide guidelines as to how these factors should be considered. Id. at
448.
14 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (requiring guided discretion).
1" 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (requiring individualized sentencing). See generally
Srikanth Srinivasan, Capital Sentencing Doctrine and the Weighing-Nonweighing
Distinction, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1347 (1995) (discussing the effects of weighing
and non-weighing statutes).
16 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999).
17 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999). See
infra note 103 (listing New York's aggravating factors).
1 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(3) (McKinney Supp. 1999). "[T]he
aggravating factor or factors proved [beyond a reasonable doubt] at trial shall be
deemed established beyond a reasonable doubt at the separate sentencing
proceeding." Id.
19 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
20 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 1999). The
prosecutor, however, is permitted to introduce, during the sentencing phase,
evidence of terrorism and evidence that in the 10 years prior to the commission
of the crime, the defendant had been convicted of two or more felony offenses
340
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Lockett mandate."' In addition to its procedural safeguards, the
provisions of New York's statute afford maximum fairness, for
example, by forbidding the execution of the mentally retarded.22
In total, the New York death penalty statute has been uniquely
drawn to pass constitutional muster.
Like all other death penalty statutes New York's statute is
subject to constitutional challenge. The New York State Court of
Appeals has already held a portion of the statute to be unconstitu-
tional.23 Such constitutional challenges likely will continue. In
1998, the first death sentence in over thirty years was imposed in
New York with others expected to follow. 24 The final destination
of such appeals soon could reach the United States Supreme Court.
This Note first reviews the Supreme Court's capital punishment
constitutional mandates and analyzes the various ways in which
death penalty statutes can be structured. It then proceeds to make
two arguments: first, that New York's death penalty statute should
be upheld as constitutional by the New York State Court of
Appeals; second, that a scheme such as New York's is the fairest
type of statute and should be adopted by all state legislatures to
satisfy the mandates set forth by the Supreme Court. While New
York's overall scheme likely will survive constitutional scrutiny,
this Note examines one provision that has not, and one provision
that may not withstand constitutional challenge. This Note argues
that New York's unique capital sentencing scheme is the most
committed at different times, if appropriate. Id. § 400.27(7).
21 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05.
22 N.Y. CRIM PRoc. LAW § 400.27(12) (McKinney Supp. 1999). See infra
Part II.C.2, discussing other examples of the statute's fairness.
23 See Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998) (striking down the
plea-bargaining provision of New York's capital punishment statute).
24 Darrel Harris is the first person to be sentenced to death under New
York's re-enacted death penalty statute of 1995. See Joseph P. Fried, Death
Penalty for Ex-Guard in Murder of 3, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1998, at Al
(discussing Harris' death sentence imposed for his murder of three people in a
robbery). See also Robert D. McFadden, Test of Death Penalty Law Quickly
Follows Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at B4 (discussing Harris' plans to
appeal his death sentence); Clyde Haberman, Golden Oldie From Pataki: Death
Ditty, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1998, at B1 (discussing Governor Pataki's active
role in bringing back New York's death penalty).
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comprehensive and consistent with the Supreme Court mandates of
guided discretion and individualized sentencing. Part I provides a
historical overview of the Supreme Court's three major decisions
addressing the structure of death penalty statutes since 1972. Part
II focuses on New York's death penalty statute, first, by examining
its structure and then, by exploring the reasons why New York's
death penalty statute accords with the Supreme Court's mandates.
Additionally, Part II explains why New York's death penalty
statute is statutorily superior to other state death penalty laws. Part
III contains an analysis of some recent and potential constitutional
challenges to New York's death penalty statute. This Note con-
cludes that the New York statute is constitutional and that states
without similar procedural protections should look to New York's
model for guidance.
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DEATH PENALTY: FROM
FURMAN" TO GREGG
26 TO LOCKE 27
In 1972, the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia28 found
that the imposition of two states' capital sentencing laws constitut-
ed "cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 29 While Furman was a per curiam
decision, limited to the statutes at issue, four years later the
elaborate reasoning of Furman's concurring opinions was incorpo-
rated into the Court's holding in Gregg v. Georgia, which mandat-
ed guided discretion in order to eliminate the imposition of death
sentences in an arbitrary and capricious manner.3 ° The power of
these concurrences was so far reaching that all executions in the
25 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
26 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
27 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
28 408 U.S. 238.
29 Id. at 239-40 (holding Georgia's and Texas's death penalty statutes
unconstitutional).
30 Gregg, 428 U.S. 153. The Supreme Court, prior to Furman, held such
guidelines unnecessary. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971). The
Supreme Court found "it quite impossible to say that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in
capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution." Id.
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thirty-nine states that utilized death penalty statutes were halted.3'
Two years following Gregg, in Lockett v. Ohio, the Supreme
Court's death penalty jurisprudence further developed to require
individualized sentencing.32 Since Furman, the process by which
a state can impose the death penalty has gone through extensive
constitutional scrutiny evolving into its present form. To understand
how the present capital statutory requirements came into existence,
an examination of Furman, Gregg, and Lockett, the Supreme
Court's three most significant decisions involving the capital
sentencing statutes, is necessary.
A. The Unconstitutionality of Unguided Discretion: The
Impact of Furman v. Georgia
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court was petitioned to
review the death sentences of three defendants.33 The defendants
claimed that their sentences violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 34 The capital statutes of Georgia and Texas ap-
peared facially constitutional, however, their application was not.35
While the Furman Court's brief per curiam opinion found that the
imposition of the death penalty in the cases before the Court
"constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments," nine separate opinions
elaborated significant principles that would further delineate
31 See Carter, supra note 8, at 324 (discussing the impact of Furman).
32 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05.
" The three defendants were Furman, Jackson, and Branch. Furman, 408
U.S. at 238. While the case name is designated Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court was reviewing the convictions of Furman and Jackson, sentenced to death
under Georgia's death penalty statute, and Branch, sentenced to death under
Texas' death penalty statute. Id. at 240 n.l.
4 Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. The United States Constitution forbids the
infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "No
state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
" Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring). "What may be said of
the validity of a law on the books and what may be done with the law in its
application do, or may, lead to quite different conclusions." Id.
343
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constitutionally acceptable capital punishment laws. 36 In a particu-
larly far reaching concurrence, Justice Stewart found that unbridled
sentencing discretion in capital cases led sentencers to randomly
impose the death penalty in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments because the statutes at issue were so broad as to
promote arbitrary imposition.37
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment requires "legislatures to write penal laws that are
evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and [] require[s] judges
to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively,
and spottily to unpopular groups."38 Justice Douglas opined that
"[i]t is unfair to inflict unequal penalties on equally guilty parties,
or on any innocent part[y], regardless of what the penalty is." 39
Justice Stewart stated that the death penalty may not be adminis-
tered in a "capricious and arbitrary" manner40 in that "the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed. '41 Justice
36 Id. at 239-40.
3 Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Georgia's penal law on forcible
rape left the jury a choice in sentencing: the death penalty, life imprisonment, or
imprisonment and labor for a period of between one and twenty years. Id. at 309
n.8. Texas' penal law on rape left the jury a choice between the death penalty,
life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a period not less than five years. Id. The
Furman Court questioned its holding in McGautha v. California that upheld the
constitutionality of a statute allowing those responsible for deciding upon a death
sentence to use their own discretion without the boundaries of mandated
standards. Id. at 247 (Douglas, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
'9 Id. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring). In strong disagreement with the
McGautha holding, Justice Douglas stated that "[j]uries ... have practically
untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die." Id.
40 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). "These death sentences are cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual ....
[T]he petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful." Id. at 309-
10. "[T]he death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most
atrocious crimes and.., there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Id. at 313
(White, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
344
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White emphasized that the Court was not holding that the existence
of the death penalty was unconstitutional, but rather that the means
of application were. 42 Ultimately, the Court held that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty in these cases was cruel and unusual in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.43 Yet, the
Court failed to set mandates on how death penalty statutes should
be structured.
B. The Narrowing Requirement: Gregg and Guided
Discretion
In response to the Furman decision, some states subsequently
amended their death penalty statutes to meet the Court's mandate
to eliminate the indistinguishable manner in which some defendants
convicted of similar crimes were sentenced to death and others
only to prison terms.' The new statutes limited the class of
people who could be sentenced to death by limiting the potential
imposition of the death penalty to specific categories of murders.45
42 Id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring). "In joining the Court's judgements,
therefore, I do not at all intimate that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se
or that there is no system of capital punishment that would comport with the
Eighth Amendment." Id.
41 Id. at 239-40. Historically, capital punishment was imposed on those of
the lower class. Id. at 255 ("One cannot read this history without realizing that
the desire for equality was reflected in the ban against 'cruel and unusual punish-
ments' contained in the Eighth Amendment."). If the death penalty is limited by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, as are other laws in this
country, then selectivity based on unpopular defendants is unconstitutional. Id.
at 255-57. By giving full discretion to the jury or judge, the death penalty is
"selectively applied"; those with more money, for example, are less likely than
less popular indigents to receive a death sentence. Id.
44 Texas, Florida, and Georgia each amended their death penalty statutes in
response to Furman. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268-271 (1976)
(examining Texas' statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253-55 (1976)
(examining Florida's statute); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196 (1976)
(examining Georgia's statute).
45 FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141 (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (1997); TEx.
CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (West 1981 & Supp. 1999). Georgia, Florida, and
Texas have enacted statutes placing limits on eligibility for imposing the death
penalty. Florida limits application of the death penalty to cases of premeditated
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1. Sentencing Guidance Through Statutory Aggravating Factors
In 1976, Georgia's death penalty statute again was subject to
Supreme Court scrutiny.46 In Gregg v. Georgia,47 the defendant
argued that the imposition of the death sentence violated the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth and the Fourteenth
Amendments. 48 The Supreme Court upheld the death penalty as
constitutional, per se.4 9 The Court held that "the punishment of
death does not invariably violate the Constitution ... [as this]
Court on a number of occasions has both assumed and asserted the
constitutionality of capital punishment., 50 The Court crafted its
Eighth Amendment analysis around the Funnan opinions,51 by
murder, murder in the perpetration of a felony, unlawful distribution of heroin
which is the proximate cause of death, or sexual battery of a child under the age
of 12. FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141 (1999). See also infra notes 58 and 65 (listing
limitations on eligibility provided by Georgia's and Texas's new statutes).
46 Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 162.
41 Id. at 168. The question of "cruel and unusual" was traditionally narrowed
to the "particular methods of execution" and "its similarity to 'torture' and other
'barbarous' methods." Id. at 169-70. "[T]he death penalty is not a form of
punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the
offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the
procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it." Id. at 187.
On the same day that Gregg was decided, the Court also ruled in Woodson
v. North Carolina that while the death penalty was constitutional per se,
mandatory imposition of the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment. 428
U.S. 280, 305 (1976). See also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (holding
that a mandatory death sentence for a prison inmate convicted of murder while
already serving a life sentence is unconstitutional); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976) (holding that a statute that calls for a mandatory death sentence
for first degree murder is unconstitutional).
o Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168-69.
51 Id. at 171, 188-89. "[T]he [Eighth] Amendment has been interpreted in a
flexible and dynamic manner." Id. at 171. The Court recognized the Furman
Court's analysis of the Eighth Amendment in dealing with the "procedures
employed to select convicted defendants for the sentence of death." Id. at 172.
The Court quoted former Chief Justice Warren declaring, "'[t]he [a]mendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
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finding that "Furman mandate[d] that where discretion is afforded
a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of
whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion
must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action."52 The Court thus sought
to eliminate the constitutional deficiencies left by the Furman
Court and laid the foundation for guided discretion.53
Emphasizing that it had "embarked upon this general exposition
to make clear that it is possible to construct capital-sentencing
systems capable of meeting Furman's constitutional concerns,"54
the Court held that this would best be "met by a system that
provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing
authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition
of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the
information. 55 The Court also held that the "further safeguard of
meaningful appellate review" is necessary "to ensure that death
progress of a maturing society'." Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958)).
51 Id. at 189.
" Id. at 194-95. "[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of
death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a
carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given
adequate information and guidance." Id. at 195.
54 id.
51 Id. at 191-95. The Court cited the American Legal Institute's Model Penal
Code as recommending a bifurcated proceeding to reduce arbitrariness by ridding
the guilt phase of prejudicial evidence relevant solely to sentencing determina-
tions. Id. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, cmt. 5, at 74-75 (Tentative Draft No.
9, 1959). The Court reasoned that "a bifurcated system is more likely to ensure
elimination of the constitutional deficiencies in Furman." Gregg, 428 U.S. at
191-92. The Court also suggested that standards of guided discretion already
existed. Id. at 193. The drafters of the Model Penal Code recommended, in a
broad sense, that aggravating and mitigating factors should be weighed against
each other. Id. "'[I]t is within the realm of possibility to point to the main
circumstances of aggravation and of mitigation that should be weighed and
weighed against each other when they are presented in a concrete case'." Id. at
193 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 ch. 3 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)).
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sentences are not imposed capriciously., 56 After recommending
this general structure, the Court examined the statute at issue.
57
2. Consideration of Georgia's Statute
Following Furman, Georgia amended its statute and narrowed
capital punishment eligibility, allowing the death penalty to be
imposed only after the sentencer had determined beyond a
reasonable doubt that at least one of ten aggravating factors
accompanied the murder.58 Furthermore, the statute also required
56 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
57 Id. at 196.
58 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (Supp. 1975). The Georgia statute made the
death penalty a punishment for murder, kidnapping for ransom, kidnapping where
the victim is harmed, armed robbery, and rape. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101, 26-
1311, 26-1902, 26-2001, 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975) (the statute also considered
treason and aircraft hijacking capital offenses). These capital felonies were the
same ones listed when Funnan was decided, with the exception of capital perjury
which was removed from the list. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163 n.6. Following
Furman, the statute was amended to list 10 aggravating factors of which, the
presence of one could subject the convicted to the death penalty: 1) a capital
offense committed by one with a prior capital felony conviction or murder
committed by one with a "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions"; 2) a capital offense committed while the offender was committing
another capital felony or aggravated battery, or murder committed while the
offender was committing first degree burglary or arson; 3) while committing a
capital offense the offender "created a great risk of death to more than one
person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally
be hazardous to the lives of more than one person"; 4) murder committed for
money or hiring someone to murder for money; 5) murder of a present or former
judicial officer or district attorney during or for reason of his duty in that
position; 6) "[tjhe offender caused or directed another to commit murder or
committed murder as an agent or employee of another person"; 7) the capital
offense was committed in a manner that was "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim"; 8) murder committed against a peace officer,
corrections employee, or a fireman engaged in duty; 9) murder committed by one
who is in or has escaped the custody of a peace officer or imprisonment; and 10)
murder committed for the reason of "avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a
lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement." GA. CODE ANN. § 27-
2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975). In Arnold v. State, 224 S.E.2d 386, 391 (Ga. 1976), the
portion of the first aggravating factor dealing with "substantial history of serious
348
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the sentencer to consider any other non-statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances that were shown to be relevant to the
case.59 The sentencer could then choose to impose a sentence of
death or recommend mercy even absent a finding of mitigating
evidence.6 °
The defendant contended that the statutory aggravating factors
were overbroad and vague, the procedure for granting mercy was
arbitrary and the sentencing proceeding allowed too large a scope
of evidence to be introduced.61 The Court upheld Georgia's death
penalty statute because it eliminated the risk of arbitrary imposition
of a death sentence by requiring separate hearings for guilt and
sentencing, the finding of at least one aggravating factor, presenta-
tion of mitigation evidence and appellate review. 62 The Court held
"[n]o longer can a Georgia jury do as Furman's jury did: reach a
finding of the defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or
direction, decide whether he should live or die. 63 The Court
concluded that:
The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast [to the
statute examined in Furman], focus the jury's attention on
the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized
characteristics of the individual defendant. While the jury
is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, it must find and identify at least one
statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a penalty
of death. In this way the jury's discretion is channeled. No
longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death
sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative
assaultive criminal convictions" was held unconstitutional, because it did not
outline "clear and objective standards." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 166 n.9. The current
Georgia statute contains the amended first aggravating factor. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-10-30 (1997).
" Id. § 27-2534.1(b).
60 Id. § 27-2302.
61 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201-04 (1976).
62 Id. at 196-98, 204-06. "The provision for appellate review in the Georgia
capital sentencing system serves as a check against the random or arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty." Id. at 206.
63 Id. at 197.
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guidelines. In addition, the review function of the Supreme
Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the
concerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not
present to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure
applied here. 4
In the decades following Gregg, the Supreme Court upheld other
state death penalty statutes that provided for guided discretion.65
64 Id. at 206-07.
65 The same day the Court decided Gregg, it upheld Florida and Texas laws
that contained similar provisions to the Georgia statute. Florida's death penalty
statute provided that the judge weigh eight aggravating factors against seven
mitigating factors to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed.
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248 n.6 (1976). "Under Florida's capital
sentencing procedures... trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance
to assist them in deciding whether to impose a death penalty or imprisonment for
life." Id. at 253. "[I]n Florida. . . it is no longer true that there is 'no meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not'." Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188,
quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
The Texas death penalty statute enumerated the following five aggravating
factors, one of which had to be proven to impose the death penalty:
The punishment for murder with malice aforethought shall be death
... if: (1) the person murdered [is] a peace officer or fireman who
was ... acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty and who the
defendant knew was a peace officer or fireman; (2) the person
intentionally committed the murder in the course of committing or
attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, forcible rape or
arson; (3) the person committed the murder for remuneration ... or
employed another to commit murder for remuneration; (4) the person
committed murder while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal
institution; (5) the person while incarcerated in a penal institution
murdered another who was employed in the operation of the penal
institution.
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (West 1974).
The jury then had to answer three questions regarding the defendant's actions
and background and if the answer to any question was "no" then the death
sentence would not be imposed. TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. §37.071 (Supp. 1975-
76). See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 265, 268-69 (1976) (upholding the Texas
death penalty statute). See also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990) (holding
Arizona's statute constitutional that provided for guided discretion through the
use of aggravating factors). "We have reiterated the general principle that
aggravating circumstances must be construed to permit the sentencer to make a
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In addition the Court re-examined, and directed the states to
narrowly define, aggravating factors.
3. The Elimination of Vagueness in Aggravating Factors
Subsequent to Gregg
The Gregg Court failed to either specify the aggravating factors
that would be acceptable or delineate how narrowly each must be
defined. Thus, statutes that the Court initially found constitutional,
such as Georgia's, were once again challenged, premised upon the
vagueness of the aggravating factor provisions.66
Just four years after approving the Georgia statute, the Court
held, in Godfrey v. Georgia, that Georgia's aggravating factor,
involving torture or aggravated battery, was not adequately
narrowed and defined. 67 The language of the aggravating factors
allowed for the death penalty if a murder was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. '68 As
every murder is "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
principled distinction between those who deserve the death penalty and those
who do not." Id. at 776. The Supreme Court has upheld death penalty statutes
in several other states that provided for guided discretion. Harris v. Alabama 513
U.S. 504, 514-15 (1995); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 979-80 (1994);
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990); Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 649, 655-56 (1990); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 389 (1985);
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464-466 (1984).
66 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (challenging Georgia's
seventh aggravating factor); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255-56 (challenging Florida's
fifth aggravating factor). The Georgia statute authorized a capital sentence for a
murder that was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (1978). The Florida statute authorized a capital
sentence for a murder committed in a manner that was "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West & Supp. 1976-1977).
The Supreme Court just four years earlier acknowledged that the provisions of
the statutes could be interpreted to apply to all murders, but still approved the
statutes holding that the legislative intent was not to "adopt such an open-ended
construction." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201.
67 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428.
68 Id.
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inhuman,"69 "[t]here [was] no principled way to distinguish this
case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases
in which it was not."7 The Court found that the trial judge failed
to provide guidance to the jury in the sentencing instructions
regarding the meaning of the aggravating factor and thus the jury's
interpretation could only have been "the subject of sheer specula-
tion. '71
Other death penalty statutes were challenged following Gregg,
premised upon the grounds that the aggravating factors were also
vague and over-broad.72 The Supreme Court invalidated the death
sentence of an Oklahoma defendant convicted under its "heinous,
atrocious or cruel" aggravating factor.7 3 Conversely, the Supreme
Court upheld Arizona's capital statute which contained similar
language.74 Arizona's statute prescribed that a judge act as
sentencer, whereas Oklahoma's and Georgia's statutes allowed a
jury to act as sentencer.75 Thus, the Arizona statute was upheld in
part because the sentencer was a judge, not a jury.76 The Supreme
Court also found other death penalty statutes valid where the
aggravating factors were narrowly structured to limit the class of
people eligible for a capital sentence.77
69 Id. at 429.
70 Id. at 433.
71 Id. at 429.
72 See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754-55 (1990) (holding
that the language, murder committed in a "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" manner,
is unconstitutionally vague).
71 See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364 (1988) (holding the
aggravating circumstance provision unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth
Amendment).
14 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653-54 (1990) (holding the
"especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating circumstance valid as
providing sufficient guidance to the sentencer).
75 See id. at 653.
76 id.
77 See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993) (Idaho's death penalty statute,
which provided for an aggravating factor of murder "with utter disregard for
human life," was not found to be too vague where the sentencer was a judge).
The Supreme Court found that a judge would not misinterpret the legislative
intent of a facially broad aggravating factor. Id. at 471. "Where ... the sentencer
is a judge rather than a jury, the federal court must presume that the judge knew
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While death penalty statutes will always present constitutional
questions, many potential questions have been addressed by the
states by having narrowed their statutes in the wake of Gregg. The
Gregg decision eliminated capricious and arbitrary imposition of
the death penalty and mandated guided discretion. In response, the
states adopted aggravating factors into their statutes. Some states,
however, took the Court's mandate to the extreme by prescribing
a mandatory death sentence for certain crimes.78 The Court,
presented with this issue, banned mandatory death sentences and
set the stage for individualized sentencing.79
C. The Lockett Requirement: Individualized Sentencing
Two years following Gregg, the Supreme Court in Lockett v.
Ohio held that the sentencer, in imposing the death penalty, must
consider certain factors, such as the capital defendant's unique
background, character, and the circumstances of the crime.8° This
statutory requirement became known as individualized sentenc-
ing.8'
In Lockett, the defendant argued that Ohio's death penalty
statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by
precluding the sentencer from considering certain mitigating
factors. 82 The Ohio death penalty statute stated that when a
and applied any existing narrowing construction." Id.
78 New York, among other states, had imposed a mandatory death penalty
which was struck down as unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's
holding in Gregg. People v. Davis, 371 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1977).
7' The Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301
(1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335 (1976), in outlawing
mandatory imposition of the death penalty, held that "individualized" sentencing
was a requirement. The Court in Lockett v. Ohio took this mandate a step further
by specifically outlining the requirement of "individualized" sentencing. 438 U.S.
586, 605-08 (1978).
80 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. Such factors are considered mitigating factors.
Id. at 605-08.
81 Id. "Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so
profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that
an individualized decision is essential in capital cases." Id. at 605.
82 Id. at 602.
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defendant is found guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and
one of seven statutory aggravating circumstances exists, the death
penalty would be imposed.83 The statute listed three mitigating
provisions that could justify a lesser sentence if proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.84 The Court reasoned that by not
allowing an examination of the defendant's character, record, the
circumstances of the crime, and other mitigating evidence, a death
sentence could be imposed where a less severe penalty would be
more appropriate.85 Thus, the Court held that individualized
consideration was a constitutional requirement in the imposition of
a death sentence under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.86
83 OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 1975).
I4 ld. In consideration of "the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
history, character, and background of the offender," one of the following three
circumstances can be considered mitigating evidence:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for
the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong
provocation.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis
or mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish
the defense of insanity.
Id.
85 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
86 Id. The Court found that other statutes did indeed provide for individual-
ized sentencing. Georgia's statute in Gregg was found to be compliant with the
individualized sentencing requirement with a broad provision allowing for the
introduction of any type of aggravating or mitigating evidence. Id. at 606. The
Court cited its previous decision in Gregg stating that "the statute permitted the
jury 'to consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances'." Id. (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976)). While the Florida statute contained
a list of mitigating factors, the Supreme Court had previously approved the
statute, concluding that the list was not exclusive. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 250 n.8 (1976). The Court held that there existed "no such limiting language
introducing the list of statutory mitigating factors." Id.
Despite the facial narrowness of the allowance of mitigation evidence, the
Supreme Court also upheld the Texas death penalty statute due to a Texas
appellate court's interpretation that left the door open to include virtually all
mitigating factors. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 272 (1976). While the Texas
statute made no direct reference to mitigating factors, it did provide that juries
would answer and consider three questions during their sentencing determination.
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The Lockett requirement of individualized sentencing led to a
proliferation of litigation determining what constituted mitigating
evidence.87 Thus, the Court has allowed evidence of turbulent
family history,88 adjustment to incarceration, mental retardation
and child abuse 9° and other non-statutory mitigating evidence to
be introduced during the sentencing phase. 9' In addition, the states
retained the power to structure the consideration of mitigating
evidence by governing "what factors the jury must be permitted to
consider in making its sentencing decision."92
Id. at 269. The second question was "whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.071(b)(1)
(West Supp. 1975-76). The Supreme Court found this question to be open-ended
in light of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' interpretation. Lockett, 438 U.S.
at 607. The Court held that the interpretation would allow the sentencer to
consider "whatever mitigating circumstances" the defendant could establish.
Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272-73.
In comparison to these statutes, Ohio's statute was found to be too narrow
in its allowance of mitigating evidence. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 607. "None of the
statutes we sustained in Gregg and the companion cases clearly operated at that
time to prevent the sentencer from considering any aspect of the defendant's
character and record or any circumstances of his offense as an independently
mitigating factor." Id. The Court interpreted Ohio's statute as allowing only the
three statutory mitigating factors to be presented in determining a defendant's
sentence, finding that many other important mitigating circumstances, such as
age, would be banned from consideration. See id. at 608. "[C]onsideration of a
defendant's comparatively minor role in the offense, or age, would generally not
be permitted, as such, to affect the sentencing decision." Id.
87 See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (allowing
adjustment to incarceration as a mitigating factor); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982) (allowing turbulent family history as a mitigating
factor); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 642 (1978) (upholding defendant's challenge
to Ohio's death penalty statute, for failing to consider particular circumstances
of the crime and aspects of his character as mitigating factors).
88 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-15.
89 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 8.
90 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 340 (1989).
9' Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987). See also Parker v.
Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 322 (1991) (holding that non-statutory mitigating evidence
must be considered).
92 Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1993).
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The Court's evolving death penalty jurisprudence from Furman
to Gregg to Lockett has evinced inherent contradictions. While
Furman and Gregg eliminated the imposition of the death penalty
in an arbitrary and capricious manner and mandated guided
discretion, Lockett required individualized sentencing. Thus, on one
hand, discretion is narrowed, while on the other hand, it is
broadened.93 Justice Scalia articulated this contradiction by
opining that "[t]o acknowledge that 'there is perhaps an inherent
tension' is rather like saying that there was perhaps an inherent
tension between the Allies and the Axis powers in World War
11.",94 A constitutionally superior statute would reconcile these
competing mandates.
II. THE NEW YORK DEATH PENALTY STATUTE
In 1995, New York revised and re-enacted the death penalty
statute. 95 The New York statute follows the mandates of Furman,
" See Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 1353-54 (discussing the asymmetrical
implications of guided discretion and individualized sentencing). "On one hand,
states must narrow the sentencer's discretion regarding whether she can impose
the death penalty in a particular case. On the other hand, states cannot limit the
sentencer's discretion to decide against imposing the death penalty for any
mitigating reason." See Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 1353. The fact that statutes
must narrow sentencer discretion and at the same time broaden discretion
"creates not just an asymmetry, but an untenable and irreconcilable doctrinal
contradiction." Id. See generally Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and
Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital
Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345 (1998); Scott E. Sundby,
The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation
in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147 (1991).
9 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 363 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
95 Before New York's death penalty statute was re-enacted, the last
execution in New York took place in 1963. See William C. Donnino, McKinney's
Practice Commentaries, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27, at 384 (McKinney 1998)
(discussing the history of New York's death penalty law). In light of Furman's
ruling, New York's death penalty statute, which previously allowed for complete
jury discretion, was held unconstitutional. People v. Fitzpatrick, 300 N.E.2d 139
(N.Y. 1973). After instituting mandatory capital punishment for certain crimes,
New York's statute again was declared unconstitutional in the aftermath of
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Gregg and Lockett.9 6 The structure of the statute is unique in that
it meets these mandates in an unprecedented fashion. Similar to
other death penalty statutes, the New York statute provides for
bifurcation of the guilt and sentencing phases, the introduction of
aggravating and mitigating factors, and appellate review.97 The
Gregg. People v. Davis, 371 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1977).
On March 8, 1995, after 18 years without the death penalty, Governor
George E. Pataki approved the revised New York death penalty legislation. See
James Dao, Death Penalty in New York is Restored After 18 Years: Pataki Sees
Justice Served, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al (discussing Gov. Pataki's
signing of the death penalty bill into law); James Dao, New York Senate
Approves Revival of Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at Al (discussing
the New York Senate's vote approving the death penalty legislation). See also
Act of Mar. 7, 1995, ch. 1, 1995 N.Y. Laws 218 (New York's death penalty
legislation). New York's death penalty law took effect on September 1, 1995.
See Jan Hoffman, Lawyers Prepare for New York's Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 1995, at Al (discussing prosecuting and defense attorneys' reactions
prior to New York's death penalty statute taking effect).
In approving and signing into law the death penalty, Governor Pataki
declared, "the citizens of New York State have spoken loudly and clearly in their
call for justice for those who commit the most serious of crimes by depriving
other citizens of their very lives. The citizens of New York State are convinced
the death penalty will deter these vicious crimes and I, as their Governor agree."
William C. Donnino, McKinney's Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.27, at 381 (McKinney Supp. 1999) (quoting Approval Mem. from
Governor approving L. 1995, ch. 1; Death Penalty (Sept. 1, 1995)). "The purpose
of this legislation is to allow for the imposition of the death penalty when a
defendant is convicted for certain types of intentional murder." Bill Mem. from
the New York State Assembly, 218th Session, 1995 Regular Session for L. 1995,
ch. 1 (March 7, 1995).
The death penalty is now authorized by law. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06
(McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999). The statute reads,
When a person is convicted of murder in the first degree ... the court
shall, in accordance with the provisions of section 400.27 of the
criminal procedure law, sentence the defendant to death, to life
imprisonment without parole ... or to a term of imprisonment for a
class A-I felony other than a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole.
Id.
96 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
97 N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW §§ 400.27, 470.30 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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statute, however, is sui generis in that it completely separates the
competing mandates of guided discretion and individualized
sentencing in a manner that enhances the value of each. While
implementing a weighing process between aggravating and
mitigating factors during the sentencing process, New York's
statute also instills a value of the non-weighing scheme to ensure
less arbitrary application of the statute, by having the aggravating
factors proven during the guilt phase.98
A. Statutory Structure
In New York, as in all states, the capital trial is bifurcated into
a guilt phase and a sentencing phase. 99 In the guilt phase, the
prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant is guilty of a crime constituting first degree murder. °° Only
those crimes listed under first degree murder constitute crimes
punishable by the death penalty.'01 Pursuant to section 125.27 of
the New York Penal Law, a person is guilty of first degree murder
when, with the intent to cause the death of a person, he causes the
death of that person or of a third person, and one of twelve
aggravating factors is present.102  These aggravating factors
include the special status of the victim, present or past circumstanc-
es of the defendant, actual circumstances of the crime and whether
the criminal act was a contract or serial killing.10 3 The defendant
98 A true weighing statute, such as Florida's, would first, at the trial phase,
determine guilt of murder in the first degree, and then, at the sentencing phase
deal with proving both aggravating and mitigating factors. FLA. STAT.
ch. 921.141 (1999). In New York, the aggravating factors are elements of the
crime of murder in the first degree. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a) (McKinney
1998 & Supp. 1999). Procedures for New York's death penalty statute are found
in N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
99 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(1) (McKinney Supp. 1999). "Upon the
conviction ... for the offense of murder in the first degree ... the court shall
promptly conduct a separate sentencing proceeding." Id.
'0o N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999).
10 Id. § 125.27(1)(a)(i-xii).
102 Id.
103 William C. Donnino, McKinney's Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.27, at 385-92 (McKinney Supp. 1999). New York's Penal Law
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must also be more than eighteen years old at the time of the
crime.'04
Unlike most weighing and non-weighing statutes, which would
introduce the aggravating factors only in the sentencing phase, New
York's statute includes the aggravating factors as part of the
definition of first degree murder. 1 5 Thus, the aggravating factors
must be proven in the guilt phase. 10 6 This statutory provision
upholds the "innocent until proven guilty" component of the
criminal justice system, while instilling a non-arbitrary means of
deciding who is eligible for the death penalty.
contains a total of 12 aggravating factors: 1) the intended victim was a police
officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, which the defendant
should have reasonably known; 2) the intended victim was a peace officer
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, which the defendant should have
reasonably known; 3) the intended victim was an employee of a state or local
correctional facility engaged in the perfornance of his or her duties, which the
defendant should have reasonably known; 4) at the time of the crime the
defendant was confined in a state correctional facility or was in custody upon a
sentence not less than 15 years, or the defendant had escaped from such
confinement or custody; 5) the intended victim was a witness to a crime,
previously testified in a criminal trial, or was an immediate family member of
a witness and the killing was done to prevent such testimony or for the purpose
of exacting retribution for prior testimony; 6) the defendant committed or
procured commission of the killing pursuant to an agreement for something of
pecuniary value; 7) the murder was committed in the course of a felony with
requirement of intent; 8) the defendant killed multiple people; 9) prior to the
killing, the defendant had been convicted of murder in the second degree, as
defined in section 125.25 of the Penal Law; 10) the killing was done in "an
especially cruel or wanton manner pursuant to a course of conduct intended to
inflict and inflicting torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death"; 11) "the
defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more additional persons within
the state in separate criminal transactions within a period of twenty-four months
when committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan"
(known also as a serial-killer aggravating factor); or, 12) the intended victim was
a judge and the defendant committed the murder because of that fact. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999).
'04 Id. § 125.27(1)(b).
105 "A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when: With intent to
cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a
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The sentencing hearing centers on the defendant's introduction
of all relevant mitigating evidence to assist the jury in determining
whether a sentence of death or life imprisonment is appropri-
ate. ' 7 The jury must then weigh the mitigating evidence present-
ed by the defendant against the aggravating factor(s) proven during
the guilt phase to determine whether a death sentence is appropri-
ate.108 The statute provides that "[t]he jury may not direct imposi-
tion of a sentence of death unless it unanimously finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that the aggravating factor or factors substantially
outweigh the mitigating factor or factors established, if any, and
unanimously determines that the penalty of death should be
imposed."' 10 9
The sentencing phase is thus, in effect, a mitigation hearing.
Aggravating factors, proven beyond a reasonable doubt in the guilt
phase, are deemed established beyond a reasonable doubt at the
sentencing phase.1 During this part of the trial, the prosecutor
cannot relitigate the aggravating factors, nor present any non-
statutory factors and is limited to presenting only rebuttal evi-
dence. 1 The only exceptions are that the prosecutor can intro-
duce evidence of terrorism or evidence that the defendant had been
convicted of two or more separate felonies within ten years of the
present crime."' The defendant is permitted to prove a number
of mitigating circumstances, including, but not limited to, defen-
dant's prior lack of criminal convictions, mental retardation or
impairment of mental capacity, duress, the level of participation in
107 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
108 Id. § 400.27(11)(a).
'09 Id. The remainder of the provision provides that, "[a]ny member or
members of the jury who find a mitigating factor to have been proven by the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence may consider such factor
established regardless of the number of jurors who concur that the factor has
been established." Id.
110 Id. § 400.27(3).
1 Id. § 400.27(6). "At the sentencing proceeding the people shall not re-
litigate the existence of aggravating factors proved at the trial." Id. In addition,
the prosecutor can not present evidence at the sentencing proceedings "except
.. in rebuttal of the defendant's evidence." Id.
112 Id. § 400.27(7).
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the crime, mental or emotional disturbance and alcohol or drug
influence." 3 The statutory provision permitting the presentation
of mitigating evidence also includes a catch-all provision that states
"any other circumstance concerning the crime, the defendant's state
of mind or condition at the time of the crime, or the defendant's
character, background, or record that would be relevant to mitiga-
tion or punishment for the crime" may be presented. 14 Because
the defendant has already been found guilty of first degree murder,
these mitigating factors may no longer constitute a defense to the
actual crime. Therefore, they need only be proven by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
15
The jury weighs the mitigating circumstances against the
aggravating factor(s) when determining the sentence.116 Jury
113 Id. § 400.27(9).
Mitigating factors shall include the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convic-
tions involving the use of violence against another person;
(b) The defendant was mentally retarded at the time of the crime, or
the defendant's mental capacity was impaired or his ability to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired but not so
impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution;
(c) The defendant was under duress or under the domination of another
person, although not such duress or domination as to constitute a
defense to prosecution;
(d) The defendant was criminally liable for the present offense of
murder committed by another, but his participation in the offense was
relatively minor although not so minor as to constitute a defense to
prosecution;
(e) The murder was committed while the defendant was mentally or
emotionally disturbed or under the influence of alcohol or any drug,
although not to such an extent as to constitute a defense to prosecution;
or
(f) Any other circumstance concerning the crime, the defendant's state
of mind or condition at the time of the crime, or the defendant's
character, background or record that would be relevant to mitigation or
punishment for the crime.
Id.
114 Id. § 400.27(9)(f).
115 Id. § 400.27(6).
116 Id. § 400.27(l1)(a).
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unanimity is not required in evaluating mitigating evidence.' 17
Rather, each individual juror can consider whether the defendant
has proven any mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 1 8 After each juror's assessment, a finding that the death
penalty should be imposed must be a unanimous decision by the
jury that the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt." 9 The jury, howev-
er, despite finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the
mitigating factors, may impose a life sentence rather than the death
penalty. 2 ° After the jury announces the sentence, each juror is
required to state for the record both the mitigating and aggravating
factors each considered in its deliberations. 12' The New York
death penalty statute also has a provision calling for mandatory and
direct appeal to the New York State Court of Appeals.
122
The Jury may not direct imposition of a sentence of death unless it
unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating
factor or factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factor or factors
established, if any, and unanimously determines that the penalty of
death should be imposed. Any member or members of the jury who
find a mitigating factor to have been proven by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence may consider such factor established





"' Id. § 400.27(11)(a).
120 Id. In order to impose a death sentence the jury must find that the
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors and then "unanimously
determine that the penalty of death should be imposed." Id. While the jury
cannot impose a death sentence if it finds that the mitigating evidence outweighs
the aggravating factors proven, it can still decide upon a life sentence even if it
finds correctly that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances
based on other circumstances, such as mercy. Id.
121 Id. § 400.27(11)(b).
122 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.30 (McKinney Supp. 1999). The New
York State Court of Appeals is required to review standard issues on appeal, if
the sentence was disproportionate to the sentences of similar cases, and whether




B. The Verdict on New York's Death Penalty Statute:
Constitutional
New York's death penalty statute, while subject to constitu-
tional challenge,'23 is indeed constitutional. 24 The statute af-
fords capital defendants substantive protective measures. It was
drafted within New York's tradition of affording greater protection
of individual rights under its state constitution than the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, re-
quires. 12' The New York death penalty statute complies with the
Supreme Court's mandates in Furman,126  Gregg,127  and
123 See infra Part III, discussing challenges to aspects of the New York
statute.
124 The New York State Court of Appeals gives an inherent presumption of
constitutionality generally to New York statutes. In People v. Davis, the New
York State Court of Appeals held that "the State statutes under scrutiny carry
with them a strong presumption of constitutionality, that they will be stricken as
unconstitutional only as a last resort and that courts may not substitute their
judgment for that of the Legislation as the wisdom and expediency of the
legislation." 371 N.E.2d 456, 462 (N.Y. 1977).
125 Hon. Stewart F. Hancock et al., Race, Unbridled Discretion, and the State
Constitutional Validity of New York's Death Penalty Statute-Two Questions, 59
ALB. L. REv. 1545, 1546 (1996). "The New York death penalty statute is a well
crafted one. It reflects a careful consideration of Supreme Court decisions and
precedents, and is unlikely to be deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
Richard Klein, Constitutional Concerns About Capital Punishment: The Death
Penalty Statute in New York State, 11 J. SUFFOLK AcAD. L. 1, 11 (1996). "In the
adoption of the new Death Penalty Statute in 1995, the legislative history shows
that every effort was made to make this statute comply with all of the Supreme
Court cases." Symposium, Does New York's Death Penalty Statute Violate the
New York Constitution?, 14 Touro L. Rev. 715, 731 [hereinafter Symposium].
"[Tlhe death penalty statute was formulated and enacted in the wake of several
United States Supreme Court decisions ... ; the Legislature most certainly took
these decisions into account in drafting the statute, and intended the terms of the
statute to be consistent with them." People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 488 (Sup.
Ct. 1997).
126 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
127 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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Lockett.128 The constitutionality of any unchallenged statute must
be examined in light of these mandates.
The Furman decision established that death penalty statutes
could not be structured so as to promote arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty.129 In Gregg the Court mandated guided discretion
through the use of aggravating factors to narrow the class of
defendants eligible for a capital sentence. 3 ° Section 125.27(1) of
the New York Penal Law sets forth twelve statutory aggravating
factors that limit the defendant's eligibility, thereby narrowing the
class of defendants that may be punished by death. 1 ' While the
aggravating factors to be considered for a capital sentencing
determination are at the same time the elements of the crime of
first-degree murder, the Supreme Court has ruled this structure to
be constitutional. 132 The New York statute permits the death
128 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See Kerry E. Ford, The New York
Death Penalty: Are Murderers in Your County Excluded?, 17 PACE L. REv. 273,
309-10 (1996). "The New York statute mirrors the statute approved by the
Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia and would therefore meet the standards
required by Furman and Gregg." Id. at 310.
129 Furman, 408 U.S. at 242. See also supra Part I.A, discussing Furman as
the precursor to the disallowance of arbitrary and capricious sentencing.
130 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195. See also supra Part I.B, discussing the Gregg
mandate of guided discretion.
' N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.27(1) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999). See supra
note 103 and accompanying text (listing the New York death penalty statute's
aggravating factors).
132 See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-46 (1988) (holding
Louisiana's statute constitutional where the only aggravating factor found by the
jury duplicated an element of the capital crime). The Supreme Court found "no
reason why this narrowing function may not be performed by jury findings at
either the sentencing phase of the trial or the guilt phase." Id. at 244-45. The
Court further explained:
Here, the 'narrowing function' was performed by the jury at the guilt
phase.. . .The fact that the sentencing jury is also required to find the
existence of an aggravating circumstance in addition is no part of the
constitutionally required narrowing process .... [The state statutory]
scheme narrows the class of death-eligible murderers and then at the
sentencing phase allows for the consideration of mitigating circum-





penalty to be imposed only after the jury finds that at least one of
the twelve aggravating factors has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. 133 After an aggravating factor is proven during the guilt
phase, the jury must conduct a weighing process during delibera-
tion to impose such a sentence. 34 New York's statutory aggravat-
ing factor scheme is modeled after the scheme held constitutional
in Gregg.135 Thus, challenging the scheme should prove to be
difficult, because the guided discretion employed by New York
complies with the Gregg mandate.
Lockett mandated individualized sentencing by requiring that
the sentencing body "not be precluded from considering as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant prof-
fers as a basis for a sentence less than death., 136 In meeting this
mandate, New York's statute guides the jury in determining a
sentence. 137 It specifically lists certain mitigating factors that the
jury should consider in its decision-making process. 138 In addi-
tion, the section has a catch-all provision allowing consideration of
any non-statutory mitigating circumstance that is presented by the
defendant. 139 The allowance of a broad range of mitigating
evidence is similar to other death penalty statutes that have already
been found constitutional.140 In fact, the New York statute ex-
ceeds the Lockett mandate by requiring that the aggravating factors
be proven in the guilt phase, thus limiting the prosecutor's role in
the sentencing phase to presentation of rebuttal evidence. While
instructions for the jury to follow in considering aggravating and
133 N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 400.27(7)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
134 Id. § 400.27(11)(a).
135 Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(a)(1) (McKinney 1998 & Supp.
1999), with GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1975).
136 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
137 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(1 1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
138 Id. § 400.27(9). See supra note 113 (listing New York's mitigating
factors).
139 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(f).
140 See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing Georgia's and
Texas' mitigating schemes that were declared constitutional).
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mitigating evidence are not constitutionally required, 4' New
York's weighing scheme does in fact establish such guidelines. 142
Consequently, the New York death penalty statute will survive
constitutional challenge as the overall structure of the statute is
constitutional. 143 The statute meets both of the Supreme Court's
capital punishment constitutional requirements: it complies with the
Furman and Gregg mandates by eliminating arbitrary and capri-
cious sentencing through the use of guided discretion and for
automatic appellate review and follows the Lockett mandate by
providing for individualized sentencing.1
141 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983). The jury is permitted "to
exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be
imposed after it [finds] that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible
for that penalty." Id. See also Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 979 (1994)
(stating that "[a] capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any
particular fact in the capital sentencing decision").
142 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(1l)(a)(McKinney Supp. 1999).
"The jury may not direct imposition of a sentence of death unless it unanimously
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factor or factors substantial-
ly outweigh the mitigating factor or factors established, if any, and unanimously
determines that the penalty of death should be imposed." Id.
143 Darrel Harris, the first person to be sentenced under the New York
Statute, made a motion during his capital trial challenging the constitutionality
of section 400.27(3) of the Criminal Procedure Law for not permitting the
relitigation of aggravating factors during the sentencing phase. People v. Harris,
676 N.Y.S.2d 440, 442 (Sup. Ct. 1998). The trial court concluded in its denial
of the motion:
The New York statutory scheme fulfills both of these requirements
[guided discretion and individualized sentencing]. Penal Law 125.27(1)
narrows the class of death-eligible persons by delineating twelve
separate aggravating factors, each of which contains a specific
aggravating factor which raises the particular crime above the vast
majority of murders. Only these enumerated aggravators, if proven at
trial, are incorporated as established into the sentencing phase. As to
the requirement that sentencing be imposed on an individualized basis,
the statute provides for a wide range of mitigators, allowing the
sentencing jury to consider "any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death."
Id. at 442 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
" "Governor Pataki assures that the infirmities in past New York legislation
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C. Statutorily Superior
The New York death penalty statute not only complies with the
Supreme Court's constitutional requirements, but its unique
structure makes it statutorily superior to the death penalty statutes
of other states. 45 Additionally, the statute provides for enhanced
procedural safeguards neither required by the Supreme Court nor
adopted by the majority of the states with death penalty statutes.
Specifically, New York law prohibits imposition of the death
penalty on the mentally retarded 146 and on those not older than
are avoided in the current law which establishes a bifurcated trial procedure and
sets forth clear standards to narrow the scope of the death penalty and to guide
the jury in determining whether to impose it." Mem. from Governor George E.
Pataki approving L. 1995, ch. 1; Death Penalty (Sept. 1, 1995).
141 "In drafting and debating a death penalty, the New York legislature
eventually passed a law that established a minimum standard for a legally
acceptable death sentencing system that is substantially higher than any set forth
by a state legislature anywhere else." Franklin E. Zimring, The Wages of
Ambivalence: On the Context and Prospects of New York's Death Penalty, 44
BUFF. L. REV. 303, 317 (1996). See Robert Weisberg, The New York Statute as
Cultural Document: Seeking the Morally Optimal Death Penalty, 44 BuFF. L.
REV. 283 (1996) (arguing that New York's death penalty law is morally
superior). "If one reads the MPC's [Model Penal Code's] death penalty provision
as an aspiration towards a legally ideal form of death penalty law, the New York
Law is its fruition, its refinement, the Vergilian classical fulfillment of it-its
legal Gothic cathedral." Id. at 293. Professor Weisberg, in declaring New York's
statute as constitutional, states:
In one sense the New York law is itself a 'constitutional moment.' It
might be read as the original MPC law with constitutional annotations
folded in to it. Line after line, the New York law incorporates
identifiable post-Furman Supreme Court cases: In its aim at being
proof against constitutional attack, it not only accrues the constitutional
wisdom of the last twenty years; it takes the most 'conservative' and
prophylactic view of constitutional law possible. One senses a sort of
contingency clause written into the margins of the New York law,
saying that this law shall be deemed prospectively amended by any
new constitutional rulings to be handed down in the future.
Id.
146 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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eighteen years of age.'47 Equally important, New York has estab-
lished the Capital Defender Office to provide those facing a
possible death sentence with skilled and experienced counsel.
Finally, the New York statute allows for direct appeal of a death
sentence to the State's highest court.
48
1. Structural Superiority
The New York statute's unique structure makes it statutorily
superior to others. The statute provides a balance between the
inherently contradictory constitutional requirements of individual-
ized, yet non-arbitrary, sentencing and at the same time, promotes
a high level of equality and fairness. 149 In doing so, the statute is
neither weighing nor non-weighing, but rather is a balance between
both, a particular aspect of the statute that makes it unique.
While weighing schemes provide specific instructions on how
the separately listed aggravating and mitigating factors are to be
weighed in determining a sentence, 5 ° they are criticized for
focusing too heavily on individualized sentencing, thus leading to
arbitrary imposition of a death sentence. 5' Conversely, non-
147 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(b) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999).
148 N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 470.30 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
149 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing inherent
contradiction between guided discretion and individualized sentencing).
150 Arizona's death penalty statute, for example, approved by the Supreme
Court, is constructed so that the court, as the sentencer, can impose a death
sentence if it finds that one or more aggravating factors are present and "no
mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency" exist. See
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 1999). See also Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 644 (1990) (upholding Arizona's mitigation scheme as constitutional).
The Court also has approved Pennsylvania's statute, which provides that the jury,
as the sentencer, can impose a death sentence if it finds at least one statutory
aggravating factor and no mitigating circumstances. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 9711 (1999). See also Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 301 (1990)
(upholding Pennsylvania's mitigation scheme as constitutional).
151 See Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 1370-71. "The weighing statute plainly
promotes the liberty view more than the nonweighing statute." Id. The "liberty
view of Furman ... accepts inconsistent outcomes in similar cases, as long as
sentencers do not base their decisions on irrelevant considerations. Since the
liberty view tolerates inconsistency, it can more easily rationalize guided
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weighing schemes list factors, both aggravating and mitigating, but
fail to provide guidelines on how these factors should be consid-
ered 52 and thus, are criticized for not focusing enough on
individualized sentencing. 53  New York's statutory structure
strikes a balance between weighing and non-weighing statutes by
meeting the Supreme Court's constitutional mandates in separate
phases of the capital trial and by prohibiting relitigation of
aggravating factors in the sentencing phase.1 54 With few excep-
tions, the majority of other states reserve proving aggravating
factors until the sentencing phase. 55 This, in effect, prejudices a
discretion and individualized sentencing." Id. at 1373-74.
152 In California, for example, the non-weighing statute simply lists factors,
both aggravating and mitigating, to be considered by the jury. CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 190.2, 190.3 (West 1999). In non-weighing states, such as California, Gregg's
guidance requirement is met by a narrowly tailored list of crimes which are death
penalty eligible. Id. § 190.2. Lockett's individualized sentencing requirement is
met by the admission of mitigating evidence. The sentencer is then provided with
no specific instructions on what to do with the evidence. Id. § 190.3.
153 Although non-weighing statutes allow the defendant to present mitigating
evidence, they lack specific guidelines for the manner in which the evidence is
to be used. See Srinivasan, supra note 15, at 1368 ("the sentencer in a nonweigh-
ing jurisdiction remains free to process the evidence in whatever way she
chooses").
154 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(6) (McKinney Supp. 1999). See
generally James R. Acker, When the Cheering Stopped: An Overview & Analysis
of New York's Death Penalty Legislation, 17 PACE L. REv. 41, 225 (1996)
(reviewing the history of New York's death penalty law). "In many of its
particulars, New York's death penalty statute is procedurally rigorous." Id.
155 New York, Louisiana, and Utah are among the minority states who define
murder with aggravating factors. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (1999)
(stating Utah's definition of aggravated murder, including numerous specific
aggravating factors). However, in Utah and other states that define murder with
aggravating factors, the death penalty statutes permit the relitigation of
aggravation. Id. §§ 76-3-207(2)(iv), 76-3-207(3). In Utah, while aggravating
factors are used to define aggravated murder and need to be proven at the guilt
phase, statutory and nonstatutory aggravating factors are also presented at the
sentencing phase. Id. Utah is considered a non-weighing state. Id. § 76-3-
207(4)(b). The Supreme Court has ruled such a structure constitutional.
New York's statute is unique compared with even the minority of states that
define murder with aggravating factors. See Acker, supra note 154, at 111
(stating that "[t]he New York statute stands virtually alone in providing that the
aggravating factors to be considered for capital sentencing purposes are one and
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defendant, because it permits the prosecutor to introduce the
aggravating factors during the sentencing phase.
156
In New York, the sentencing phase provides for the defendant
to present mitigating evidence, which needs only to be proven by
a preponderance of the evidence. 5 7 In addition, the defendant is
permitted to submit reliable hearsay, contrary to the usual rules of
evidence. 5 8 The hearing is led by the defendant and the prosecu-
tor may only rebut the evidence presented.1 59 By prohibiting the
relitigation of aggravating factors at the sentencing phase, New
York's statute prevents the resulting prejudice by a prosecutor
orchestrating the proceedings. In addition, the prosecutor is not
permitted to introduce non-statutory aggravating factors. 16° In
other state statutes, the sentencing phase is not a defendant
mitigation hearing. Control over the hearing is shared, and the
prosecutor's duty to present and prove aggravating factors often
overshadows the defendant's presentation of mitigating factors.
New York's structure limits the role of the prosecutor more than
any other state statute. 161 Thus, while the jury must weigh the
aggravating and mitigating factors against each other during
deliberation, the sentencing hearing is not a forum for the prosecu-
tor to present aggravating evidence. The undue prejudice, evident
in other statutory structures, is thus minimized.
New York's statute also goes to considerable lengths in
defining aggravating factors, such as felony-murder,1 62 serial
the same ... as the elements of the crime of first-degree murder."). While Utah
has a similar structure to New York's, it is classified as a non-weighing statute.
Id. See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2) (1999) (stating that "any other facts
in aggregation or... any evidence" is permitted to be considered by the court
during the sentencing phase).
156 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999).





162 New York's aggravating factor of felony-murder is limited and varies
significantly from the second degree murder felony-murder provision. N.Y. CRIM
PROC. LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999). For felony-
murder to be considered a capital aggravating factor, the murder must be
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killing 163 and murder committed in a "heinous, atrocious, and
cruel" manner.' 64 Further, New York's statute provides a sub-
stantive mitigation section. 165 The statute circumscribes the broad
allowance of mitigation through a comprehensive list of fac-
tors. 16 6 A catch-all mitigation provision is also included allowing
for any other relevant mitigating evidence to be admissible at the
sentencing phase. 167 In addition, juror unanimity is not requir-
ed, 168 allowing jurors to make individual determinations and not
to be swayed by other jurors who may not accept the mitigating
factors presented. 69 While this scheme seems the most obvious
intentional. Id. In addition, the types of felonies defined in capital felony-murder
are limited. Id. See Weisberg, supra note 145, at 293-94 (stating that capital
felony-murder in New York maintains the concept of intent as a necessary
element of capital eligibility).
163 New York's aggravating factor of serial killing is defined as the
intentional murder "of two or more additional persons within the state in separate
criminal transactions within a period of twenty-four months when committed in
a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan." N.Y. CRIM PROC.
LAW § 125.27(l)(a)(xi) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999). See Weisberg, supra
note 145, at 295 (stating that New York's serial killer aggravating factor gives
the "first formal definition of serial killing in American legislation"). See also
People v. Mateo, 712 N.E.2d 692 (N.Y. 1999) (finding that the defendant
charged with capital murder under the serial killer aggravating factor had not
committed the crimes in a similar fashion therefore dismissing the counts).
16' New York's 10th aggravating factor, murder committed in a "heinous,
atrocious, and cruel" manner, specifically defines the terms "torture" and
"depraved" to hinder attempts to challenge it for vagueness. N.Y. CRIM PROC.
LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(x) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999). See Weisberg, supra
note 145, at 297 (stating that New York's 10th aggravating factor goes to lengths
to satisfy the mandate of Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)).
165 See Brian Hauck et al.,Capital Punishment Legislation in Massachusetts,
36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 479, 496 (1999) (comparing Massachusetts's death
penalty legislation with New York's death penalty statute). "This is consistent
with guidelines laid out in Lockett and is similar to language used in New York's
much-praised death penalty statute." Id. (citations omitted).
166 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
167 Id. § 400.27(9)(f).
161 Id. § 400.27(11)(a). See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (setting
forth the rule that juror unanimity on individual mitigating circumstances is
unnecessary). See also Hauck et al., supra note 165, at 496 (comparing
Massachusetts's death penalty legislation with New York's death penalty statute).
169 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(11)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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way to conform to the individualized sentencing requirement, many
death penalty statutes fail to include such a provision.
1 70
2. Procedural Safeguards
New York's statute provides for procedural safeguards not
mandated by the Supreme Court or incorporated into the death
penalty statutes of a majority of other states. In New York, the
prosecutor is required to give notice of intent to seek the death
penalty. 171 The statute permits the prosecution to withdraw its
intent to seek the death penalty at any time. 172 Jurors must be
questioned on their bias in favor of or against the death penal-
ty.173 In addition, upon a showing of good cause that the jury was
prejudiced during the guilt phase, the court may dismiss the jury
and empanel a second jury for the sentencing phase.174
While the United States Supreme Court has held that execution
of the mentally retarded is not unconstitutional, T17  New York's
17o See, e.g., supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the Texas
statute's facially narrow mitigation scheme).
171 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.40(1) (McKinney 1998). The prosecution
must serve notice of intention to seek the death penalty within 120 days of the
defendant's arraignment, unless the court extends the time period for a showing
of good cause. Id. § 250.40(2). Upon filing of such a notice the defendant has
60 additional days in which to file new or supplemental motions. Id. § 250.40(3).
A notice to seek the death penalty may be withdrawn at any time by written
notice filed with the court and served upon the defendant. Id. § 250.40(4). After
such a withdrawal, another notice of intent to seek the death penalty may not be
refiled. Id.
172 Id. § 400.27(1). "Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude the
people at any time from determining that the death penalty shall not be sought."
Id.
173 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 270.16(1), 270.20(f) (McKinney 1998).
A challenge for cause to a prospective juror may be based on the fact that "the
prospective juror entertains such conscientious opinions either against or in favor
of such punishment [of death] as to preclude such juror from rendering an
impartial verdict or from properly exercising the discretion conferred upon such
juror." Id. § 270.20(1)(f).
174 N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 400.27(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999). See also
Weisberg, supra note 145, at 295.
175 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (permitting the
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statute forbids the execution of a defendant found to be mentally
retarded. 176 The only exception is the allowance of the death
penalty to be imposed on an inmate found mentally retarded who
murders another in prison. 177 New York's statute provides that
upon a motion by the defendant, the Court will conduct a separate
hearing to determine whether the defendant suffers from mental
retardation.178 The statute also provides a concise definition of
mental retardation.179 While New York is not the only state to
ban the death penalty on those found to be mentally retarded, it
holds the minority position. 18° Of the thirty-eight states that have
active death penalty statutes, only twelve have banned such execu-
tions. 8'
The United States Supreme Court has established a minimum
age limit of sixteen for a defendant to be eligible for the death
penalty. 82 Following the Court's concession, the majority of
execution of an individual found to be functioning at a seven year old level).
176 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12) (McKinney Supp. 1999) (providing
a mental retardation exception to New York's death penalty statute).
177 Id. § 400.27(12)(d).
178 Id. § 400.27(12)(a).
179 Mental retardation is defined as "significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior
which were manifested before the age of eighteen." Id. § 400.27(12)(e). See
Weisberg, supra note 145, at 283 (praising the New York statute's definition and
procedures for determining if a defendant is mentally retarded).
180 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (West 1981 & Supp.
1998). Texas's death penalty statute fails to exclude those found to be mentally
retarded. Id.
"' The 12 states in addition to the Federal Government that forbid the
execution of defendants found to be mentally retarded are Arkansas, Colorado,
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, New
York, Tennessee and Washington. Death Penalty Information Center, Mental
Retardation and the Death Penalty (visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.-
essential.org/dpic/dpicmr.html>. Nebraska recently became the 12th state to ban
the execution of the mentally retarded. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-105.1 (1995
& Supp. 1998). Since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976, 34
defendants with mental retardation have been executed. Death Penalty Informa-
tion Center (visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpicmr.html>.
182 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994). See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380
(1989) (holding defendant must be 16 years old to be eligible for the death
penalty); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that the
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states with capital punishment laws set the minimum age at
something less than eighteen. 83 More justly, New York provides
that the defendant must be at least eighteen years of age.
84
New York's statute provides that all indigent capital defendants
receive the assistance of two attorneys, one of whom must be an
experienced lead attorney. 85 One of the concerning aspects of
capital punishment litigation is the high level of ineffective
assistance of counsel. 86 This is due in large part to the lack of
funding to capital defender organizations and individual lawyers.
This situation is magnified in southern states that place caps on the
fees that may be received for court-appointed lawyers in felony
cases. 187 As a result, the representation afforded to capital defen-
dants generally is substandard. New York, however, has established
the Capital Defender's Office to provide quality legal services for
those facing capital punishment. 88 The Office not only hired a
age of 15 was too young for a defendant to be found eligible for the death
penalty).
183 Death Penalty Information Center, Minimum Death Penalty Ages by
American Jurisdiction (visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/-
dpic/juvagelim.html>. Currently, only 16 states have a minimum age of 18. Id.
Five states have chosen 17 and the remaining seventeen states have chosen 16
for the minimum age to be eligible for the death penalty. Id.
184 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(b) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999).
See also Symposium, supra note 125, at 732 (discussing the federal and New
York age limitation for the death penalty).
185 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999). See also id. § 35-b(l)
("the defendant shall be entitled to the appointment of counsel and investigative,
expert and such other reasonably necessary services").
186 See Klein, supra note 125, at 27 (discussing the quality of counsel
afforded defendants in capital cases).
187 Klein, supra note 125, at 27-28. See also Symposium, supra note 125, at
749 (discussing quality of capital defense in southern states as compared to New
York).
188 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b (McKinney Supp. 1999). See Klein, supra note
125, at 28-29 (discussing effective assistance of counsel through creation of
Capital Defender Office). See also Zimring, supra note 145, at 317 (stating that
"no element in the new system undermines the executioner's prospects as much
as the extensive provisions for defense representation").
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highly trained staff, 89 but a widely respected and experienced
director. 9 °
While the Supreme Court has mandated appellate review of
death sentences,' 9' the New York statute provides for automatic
and direct review by the New York State Court of Appeals, the
State's highest court. 92 The New York State Court of Appeals is
empowered to review the record and decide whether the sentence
imposed was excessive or disproportionate to the crime committed,
against the weight of the evidence, or influenced by "passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary" factor including race.1 93 In
addition, the court must consider aggravating and mitigating factors
established in the record and any similar cases the lower court
analyzed in conducting its proportionality review. 94 The court
also has the power to review unpreserved errors. 195
The New York statute's unique structure, providing for a
mitigation hearing conducted by the defendant, is superior to other
statutes because it promotes fairness and allows defendants to
189 See Symposium, supra note 125, at 749-50 ("In New York we have had
the Court of Appeals approve monies being given to assist counsel in a capital
case for paralegal work, as well as for lower-level associates").
'90 See Daniel Wise, State's Capital Defender with a Calling, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
11, 1995, at 1 (discussing the qualifications of Kevin Doyle, the chief Capital
Defender in New York). Mr. Doyle displayed his intense dedication by
proclaiming to be "committed to the intense litigation of every capital case." Id.
Mr. Doyle was chosen after a nationwide search of over 50 applicants. Id. Mr.
Doyle's previous experience included a period of six years as an attorney at the
Alabama Capital Representation Resource Center. Id. The Capital Defender
Office has also produced work for New York's Legal Aid Society and other
private attorneys. Id.
191 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (calling appellate review
an "important constitutional safeguard").
'92 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.30(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999). "Whenever
a sentence of death is imposed, the judgment and sentence shall be reviewed on
the record by the court of appeals. Review by the court of appeals ... may not
be waived." Id. See also N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b) (1987) ("Appeals to the
court of appeals may be taken ... [i]n criminal cases, directly from a court of
original jurisdiction where the judgment is of death").
19' N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.30(3) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
'94 Id. § 470.30(4).
'9' Id. § 470.15.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
present evidence that a death sentence is not warranted. The New
York statute is also one of the most humane, disallowing imposi-
tion on the mentally retarded and those younger than eighteen.
Furthermore, the enhanced procedural safeguards, especially the
formation of the Capital Defender Office and direct appeal to the
New York State Court of Appeals, makes New York's death
penalty law not only one of the most comprehensive, but also one
that significantly attempts to protect the defendant's rights.
III. RECENT AND POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
NEW YORK'S DEATH PENALTY STATUTE
As with all death penalty statutes, the New York statute is
subject to constitutional challenge. A successful challenge to a
particular provision of the death penalty statute, however, will most
likely not result in a repeal of the entire law.196 The unchallenged
or unaffected remainder will remain in force. 197 In fact, such
challenges have commenced. In December 1998, the New York
State Court of Appeals struck down the plea-bargaining provision
for capital crimes. 198 The court will be hearing several arguments
presented by Darrel Harris, the first defendant to be sentenced to
death in New York under the re-enacted legislation.199 Future
196 See, e.g., Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998) (striking down
the plea-bargaining provision of the statute while leaving the remainder of the
statute in effect). Although the New York State Court of Appeals struck down
the plea-bargaining provision, it held that the legislature's desire to keep the law




199 On June 6, 1998, Darrel Harris was the first person to be sentenced to
death under New York State's re-enacted death penalty law. Joseph P. Fried,
Death Penalty for Ex-Guard in Murder of 3, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1998, at Al.
Harris was convicted of first degree murder for killing three people during an
attempted robbery. Id. While his execution by lethal injection was scheduled for
September 1998, Harris is presently appealing his sentence. See Robert D.
McFadden, Test of Death Penalty Law Quickly Follows Decision, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 1998, at B4 (discussing Harris' plans to appeal his death sentence). The
New York State Court of Appeals has granted a motion for assignment of
counsel for any appeals brought on behalf of Darrel Harris. People v. Harris, 703
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challenges may test the strength of New York State's death penalty
statute.2 °°
N.E.2d 267 (N.Y. 1998).
200 This Note discusses two provisions of the New York statute, one of
which was ruled unconstitutional and another that appears vulnerable to
constitutional challenge. Other provisions, of course, may face constitutional
scrutiny.
While it has not been used by a prosecutor yet, the 10th aggravating factor
listed in New York's statute may be subject to constitutional scrutiny. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(x) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999). The factor
states, "the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner pursuant
to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting torture upon the victim
prior to the victim's death." Id. Many state statutes that have as an aggravating
factor crimes committed in a "cruel and wanton manner," or similar language,
have been tested by the United States Supreme Court for vagueness and continue
to be challenged. The New York provision appears on its face to be more
narrowly defined than those found to be unconstitutionally vague. Id. The
aggravating factor defines torture as "the intentional and depraved infliction of
extreme physical pain." Id. The statute defines depraved as "the defendant
relished the infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing
debasement or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of pleasure in
the infliction of extreme physical pain." Id. New York's provision defines
"torture" and "depraved" in an attempt to narrow the provision's meaning. While
the New York provision does not simply use the "especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel" language that was common among provisions struck down in the past,
it still may be deemed unconstitutionally vague due to the nature of such
provisions. See Klein, supra note 125, at 23 ("Such language [§ 125.27(l)(a)(x)]
lacks clarity and specificity"). The New York provision, however, has yet to be
tested. The likelihood is that New York district attorneys will avoid seeking the
death penalty under this aggravating factor to avoid potentially strong appellate
debate on the issue.
An attempt was made to challenge New York's age requirement as vague
since its language, "more than 18," may be interpreted to mean 19. Today's
News: Update, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1999, at 1 (describing where a defendant
argued the statute required a minimum age of 19 to be eligible for the death
penalty). The judge ruled that the statute simply meant that a defendant could be
charged with first-degree murder any time after his 18 birthday. Id. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(b) (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 1999) (providing that the
defendant must be "more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission
of the crime"). See also Salvatore J. Modica, New York's Death Penalty: The
Age Requirement, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 585 (1999) (discussing the
legislative intent behind the language of the age requirement).
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A. Plea-Bargaining Provision
New York amended its statute in 1995 enabling a defendant
charged with first-degree murder to plead guilty in exchange for a
lesser sentence than death.20 ' The constitutional dilemma sur-
rounding a plea-bargaining provision is that it gives prosecutors
ammunition to use against defendants potentially facing a death
sentence. 20 2 The defendant on trial for first-degree murder risks
a potential death sentence. The risk of death thus can be used to
compel a defendant to plead guilty and waive his Sixth Amend-
ment right to a trial by jury.20 3 The New York State Court of
Appeals in 1998, following the reasoning of the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Jackson,2° struck down the plea-
bargaining provision of the statute.20 5
201 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10(5)(e) (McKinney 1995). The statute
provides in pertinent part:
A defendant may not enter a plea of guilty to the crime of murder in
the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of the Penal Law;
provided, however, that a defendant may enter such a plea with both
the permission of the court and the consent of the people when the
agreed upon sentence is either life imprisonment without parole or a
term of imprisonment for the class A-1 felony of murder in the first
degree other than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
Id. A defendant can also change his plea from not guilty to guilty pursuant to
section 220.10(5)(e). Id. § 220.30(3)(b)(vii). Prior to 1995, a defendant could not
plead guilty to a first degree murder charge. Id. § 220.10(5)(e) (McKinney 1980)
(amended 1995).
202 See Symposium, supra note 125, at 722-23 (arguing that such a provision
puts an "unconstitutional burden" on the defendant).
203 The United States Constitution provides that all criminal defendants have
"the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See Mary R. Falk & Eve Cary, Death-Defying Feats: State Constitutional
Challenges to New York's Death Penalty, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 161 (1995) (stating
that it can "undoubtedly be argued that the new statute impermissibly burdens
the guarantee against compelled self-incrimination and the right to trial by jury
that are contained in both the New York and Federal Constitutions").
204 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
205 Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201 (N.Y. 1998).
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In 1968, the Supreme Court in United States v. Jackson, °6
reviewing a similar provision stated that, "[t]he inevitable effect of
any such provision, is of course, to discourage assertion of the
Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of
the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial. 2 °7 While ac-
knowledging the necessity of plea-bargaining in the criminal justice
system, °8 the Court held that such a provision penalizes a defen-
dant for pleading not guilty and, thus is unconstitutional. 20 9 The
Court then concluded that the unconstitutionality of an aspect of a
statute does not always defeat the constitutionality of the entire
statute.2"
On December 22, 1998, the New York State Court of Appeals,
following this reasoning, found the plea-bargaining provision
unconstitutional. 21 "[U]nder the New York statute, only those
defendants who exercise the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial put
themselves at risk of death. 21 2 The New York State Court of
Appeals, while upholding the goals of plea-bargaining, ruled that
206 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
207 Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581. "If the provision had no other purpose or effect
than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose
to exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional." Id.
208 "The power of a court to accept a plea of guilty is traditional and
fundamental. Its existence is necessary for the practical administration of the
criminal law." Id. at 584 (quoting United States v. Willis, 75 F. Supp. 628, 630
(D.D.C. 1948)).
209 "It is established that due process forbids convicting a defendant on the
basis of a coerced guilty plea." Id. at 582 n.20. Such actions "needlessly chill the
exercise of basic constitutional rights." Id. at 582.
210 Id. at 585.
21' Hynes v. Tomei, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1209 (N.Y. 1998) (ruling sections
220.10(5)(e) and 220.30(3)(b)(vii) of the New York death penalty statute
unconstitutional). See also New York State Constitutional Decisions: 1998
Compilation Right to Trial by Jury, 15 TouRo L. REv. 1324 (1999) (discussing
the New York State Court of Appeals striking down the plea bargaining
provision in Hynes).
212 Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1205. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that
no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself"); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing criminal defendants the right to a
trial by jury).
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a defendant could not plead guilty to first-degree murder during the
period of time that a notice of intent to seek the death penalty was
pending.1 3 In the most significant part of the ruling, the court
considered whether the plea-bargaining provisions were
severable.2 14 The court examined the legislative intent, holding
that the goal behind New York's death penalty law was evident
from its severability clause and that its main purpose was to
provide for capital punishment. 215 Thus, the New York State
Court of Appeals ruled that, while the plea-bargaining provisions
were indeed unconstitutional, they were severable, and the
remaining portions of the statute would remain intact.216
B. Prosecutorial Discretion
The New York statute lacks guidelines regarding prosecutorial
discretion, leaving prosecuting attorneys to decide whether to
invoke the death penalty in their particular jurisdictions z.2 7 Thus,
213 Hynes, 706 N.E.2d at 1208-09.
214 Id. at 1207-08.
215 Id. at 1208.
[It is clear from the face of the statute before us that the very purpose
of the Legislature and Governor in enacting the statute was to provide
for capital punishment in New York. The statute's severability clause
indicates that the lawmakers would not have wanted the entire statute
to fail if the particular provisions regarding pleas were declared
unconstitutional.
Their removal would not affect the classification of capital offenses,
or the conduct of the trial or penalty phase of capital cases.
Id.
216 Id.
217 No provision providing for prosecutorial discretion, other than the
eligibility requirements of section 125.27, exist in New York's death penalty
statute. See Jonathan DeMay, Note, A District Attorney's Decision Whether to
Seek the Death Penalty: Toward an Improved Process, 26 FORDHAM URB. L. J.
767 (1999) (arguing for the imposition of controls over prosecutorial discretion);
John M. Shields, Constitutional Challenges to New York State's Death Penalty
Statute, 25 FoRDHAM URB. L. J. 255, 262-66 (1998) (discussing unfettered
discretion given to prosecutors leading to arbitrary application of death penalty);
Hancock et al., supra note 125, at 1563-64 (discussing impact of unlimited
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there is a strong argument that the statute will and has been applied
in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.218 Prosecutors in
different jurisdictions and locations hold different beliefs regarding
the use of the death penalty. 219 The lack of standards in the
power to seek the death penalty may lead to arbitrary imposition,
which would directly conflict with the Furman and Gregg
mandates. 22' The result may be different sentences for similarly
situated defendants in different jurisdictions, depending on the
individual beliefs of each prosecuting attorney.221 In fact, lack of
uniformity already is apparent.222 Not only does there appear to
be a disparity between prosecutors in upstate and downstate New
York in seeking the death penalty, 223 but the disparity is evident
prosecutorial discretion as based upon individual prosecutors' beliefs); Klein,
supra note 125, at 19-20 (discussing how the lack of prosecutorial discretion
causes an inconsistency with the Furman and Gregg mandates).
218 See People v. Harris, 675 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (denying Harris'
motion challenging New York's death penalty statute for failing to provide
prosecutors guidelines for selecting defendants for the death penalty).
219 See Klein, supra note 125, at 19 (discussing different district attorneys'
beliefs regarding the death penalty). The District Attorney of Bronx County,
Robert T. Johnson, has often stated that he will not seek the death penalty no
matter what the circumstance. See Klein, supra note 125, at 19. On the other
hand, District Attorney Jeane Pirro of Westchester County favors the death
penalty. See Klein, supra note 125, at 19-20.
220 See Klein, supra note 125, at 20 ("[B]ecause of the geographic disparity,
there might very well be a strong argument made that the New York statute does
not have the kind of consistency in the application of the death penalty that was
mandated in Furman and Gregg.").
221 See Ford, supra note 128, at 274-78 (discussing prosecutors' different
beliefs in regards to the death penalty).
222 See Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that the
Governor has the discretionary authority to supersede a district attorney in a
particular matter). Governor Pataki removed District Attorney Johnson from a
capital eligible case because of his refusal to seek the death penalty. See James
Dao, The Governor: District Attorney Wouldn't Move, Pataki Aides Say, So He
Was Moved, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at B2 (discussing District Attorney
Johnson's unwillingness to seek the death penalty and Governor Pataki's
response).
223 See Daniel Wise, Prosecutors Show Caution Seeking Capital Sentences,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 13, 1999, at 1 (discussing the disparity between upstate and
downstate prosecutors in seeking the death penalty in capital eligible cases).
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even between prosecutors in the five boroughs of New York
City.
224
Among the appeals that Darrel Harris is likely to bring before
the New York State Court of Appeals, an argument based on lack
of prosecutorial guidance in seeking the death penalty is
foreseeable, considering the level of opposition to the lack of
guidelines. While the lower court rejected Harris' challenge, there
are strong arguments to support a challenge to the lack of prosecu-
torial guidelines.225 It is possible, however, that such disparities
have been and will continue to be tolerated.226 The fact is, once
a defendant is eligible for capital punishment, it is difficult to




The death penalty is a constantly debated topic in our society.
From the morality of the punishment to its procedural implementa-
tion, the United States Supreme Court has rendered countless
decisions in an attempt to conform the death penalty to the United
Upstate prosecutors are seeking the death penalty at a much higher rate than
those from New York City. Id. While many reasons exist to explain this
disparity, the reluctance of District Attorneys in New York, Bronx, and Nassau
Counties to consider the death penalty, might be one explanation. Id.
224 See supra note 219 (discussing the different beliefs of district attorneys
within New York City).
225 See People v. Harris, 675 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (denying Harris'
motion that challenged the New York death penalty statute's lack of prosecutorial
guidelines in choosing who will receive the death penalty). See also New York
State Constitutional Decisions: 1998 Compilation Separation of Powers, 15
TouRo L. REv. 1381 (1999) (reviewing the Court's decision on Harris' motion).
226 See Harris, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 744. In denying Harris' motion challenging
the lack of prosecutorial discretion, the court held that "[t]here is no basis for
this claim. The Legislature is not required to set such standards .... It is well
settled that prosecutors are given wide latitude to charge offenses under the law.
Such decisions are generally beyond judicial review." Id.
227 See Symposium, supra note 125, at 742 (stating that it is unlikely "that
a defendant is going to have the ability to go in behind the closed door of the
decision-making process to determine what went into that prosecutor's mind in
determining whether to seek the death penalty or not").
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States Constitution, specifically the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. While Gregg declared the death penalty constitutional, two
requirements must be met before a state's capital punishment
statute can pass constitutional scrutiny: guided discretion and
individualized sentencing. In addition, several other factors shape
the way a state legislature can mold death penalty statutes. While
the Supreme Court has not ruled on its preference for a particular
scheme, this Note has illustrated that the structure adopted by New
York ensures the highest degree of equality and fairness for capital
defendants.
The New York death penalty statute does not simply meet the
constitutional threshold established by the United States Supreme
Court but rises above the Court's mandates. Its unique structure
and ability to strike a balance between the inherently contradictory
constitutional requirements of guided discretion and individualized
sentencing allows New York to impose the penalty of death
evenhandedly. Moreover, the statute provides for enhanced
procedural safeguards neither required by the Supreme Court nor
adopted by the majority of the states with death penalty statutes.
This combination makes New York's death penalty law statutorily
superior to the capital punishment laws of other states.
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